Vol. II · Cryptographic Verdict Record
Pillar 2 - Pre-Clearance Authorization
SAMPLE - Pillar 2
Cryptographic Verdict Record - Pre-Clearance Authorization.
This is a sample Cryptographic Verdict Record - the operational data half of a JIL Court Ready Evidence Bundle (CREB). The fields below show the structure of every real verdict: identifiers, subject, test profile, the full check matrix, the final verdict, and the cryptographic seal anchored to the JIL L1 chain by 14-of-20 SCN BFT validator quorum. Signed with hybrid Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) for post-quantum durability.
Sample notice. All identifiers, hashes, signatures, validator quorum payloads, and timestamps in this document are fictitious. They preserve the structure of a real CREB envelope so a custodian or compliance officer can see exactly what JIL produces. Real records carry the same structure with live hashes anchored on the JIL L1 chain.
175
Production checks across the institutional catalogue.
14 / 20
SCN BFT validator quorum signing every record.
FIPS 204
Post-quantum standard. Hybrid Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 on every signature.
75
Patent claims filed across attestation, evidence, and consensus.
273
Production services in continuous operation.
~1.4M
Lines of production code, third-party reviewed.
DOCUMENT BODY
Cryptographic Verdict Record - verbatim sample envelope.
All cryptographic content below is preserved verbatim from the canonical sample. Tables, hash strings, signature blocks, and validator quorum payloads have not been modified - they are the sample.
JIL Sovereign Technologies, Inc.
Cryptographic Verdict Authority - Pillar 5
Report Identifier
JIL-VR-PC-2026-04-19-E4D3C2B1
Issued: 2026-04-19 16:21:09 UTC
Completed: 2026-04-19 16:21:14.734 UTC
Scan to verify
/verify/JIL-VR-PC-2026-04-19-E4D3C2B1
/verify/JIL-VR-PC-2026-04-19-E4D3C2B1
Cryptographic Verdict Record
Court-Admissible - Independently Verifiable - Tamper-Evident
SAMPLE - FICTITIOUS SUBJECT DATA
Executive Summary (plain English)
Verdict: CLEARED
Authorization attested. Fireblocks executes transfer from its own infrastructure.
Question we answered
Fireblocks has a 15 BTC client transfer queued. Before they authorize it, is the destination rail + counterparty safe? JIL never holds keys - we only attest.
What you told us (inputs)
| From (requesting custodian) | Fireblocks, Tenant fb:tenant:42, NYDFS-regulated |
| Origination vault | Fireblocks vault_prod_042, Subject-Y institutional segregated |
| Origination quorum status | 4-of-6 Fireblocks co-signers already approved internally |
| Asset | 15.00000000 BTC ($943,500 USD at assessment time) |
| Destination (claimed) | Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC, wallet cc:wallet:982adf, LEI 549300WCGS4OTMZUCO90 |
| Destination rail | Bitcoin mainnet |
| JIL's role | Non-custodial pre-authorization - JIL never holds keys, never moves assets |
What we checked
- 100 of 111 approved checks (non-custodial authorization profile)
- Destination counterparty legal identity + regulatory status (GLEIF + NYDFS + SEC qualified-custodian)
- Destination wallet SDN hash-table lookup across 10 jurisdictional lists
- Destination wallet age + contamination + rail integrity
- Destination venue attestation file (proof-of-reserves, SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001)
- Origination custodian credential + quorum attestation
- Source-of-funds chain of custody since original acquisition
- Bitcoin mainnet rail health (block-height, mempool, fees, network incidents)
What we found
- Destination counterparty is Coinbase Custody - a NYDFS-chartered trust with SOC 1/2 Type II, ISO 27001, proof-of-reserves attestation on file
- Destination wallet is 723 days old, not a newly-created address; first funded 2024-04-26
- Zero sanctions matches on origination OR destination across all 10 lists
- Destination 2-hop contamination 0.0001% (well below 1% threshold)
- US-US corridor, no cross-border travel-rule trigger
- Bitcoin mainnet operating normally at block-height 889,213 - mempool healthy, fees normal
- Origination source-of-funds chain confirmed back to 2024-03-11 OTC acquisition
- 14 of 20 validators signed across 10 jurisdictions (70% BFT threshold exceeded)
Recommended action
Authorization certificate issued to Fireblocks. Fireblocks executes the Bitcoin transfer from its own infrastructure. JIL takes no custody and does not participate in the asset movement. Sealed authorization certificate retained in Fireblocks SDV for 15+ years.
0Identifiers, Retrieval, and Retention
- Report ID (this document)
- JIL-VR-PC-2026-04-19-E4D3C2B1
- Attestation ID
- ATT-892449-0000009228
- Vendor ID (requester)
- VND-FIREBLOCKS-0001 (Fireblocks - Tenant Config v42, onboarded 2025-03-18)
- Profile ID
- PRF-PRECLEAR-CUSTODIAN-BFT-v5.0
- Date Completed
- 2026-04-19 16:21:14.734 UTC (epoch 1776662474.734)
- Storage Location (vendor-controlled)
- Vendor SDV endpoint sdv://VND-FIREBLOCKS-0001.eu-north.jil-sdv/, object key verdicts/pre-clearance/2026/04/19/JIL-VR-PC-2026-04-19-E4D3C2B1.pdf.sealed. AES-256-GCM encrypted, vendor-held key.
- Content Hash (SHA-256)
- d4e5f67890a1b2c3abcdef9876543210fedcba0123456789abcdef0123456789
- Retention Period
- 15 years minimum. Exceeds BSA / FATF / NYDFS / HIPAA requirements. Permanent retention may be elected by vendor.
- Retrieval Index (JIL-side)
- Indexed in trust.verdict_records + replicated to verdict_index.clickhouse. Queryable by report_id, attestation_id, vendor_id, profile_id, date_completed, subject_hash, L1 anchor tx.
- Retrieval API
- Authenticated vendors: GET /api/v1/verdicts/{report_id}. Courts/regulators: GET /verify/{report_id} returns verification metadata without PII; blob retrieval requires vendor consent or court order served on vendor.
1Subject of Verdict
- Request Type
- Pre-Clearance & Verdict Confirmation (Pillar 5) - Non-Custodial Authorization
- Requesting Custodian
- Fireblocks, Tenant fb:tenant:42, Client-ID hash fb:8e3d:1f2a:7c6b
- Asset in Custody
- 15.00000000 BTC ($943,500 USD equivalent at verdict time)
- Origin (Fireblocks vault)
- Vault ID vault_prod_042 (JIL never sees the private key)
- Destination (claimed)
- Redacted institutional counterparty Coinbase Custody, Wallet ID cc:wallet:982adf
- Chain
- Bitcoin mainnet
- Purpose Code
- TREASURY - Institutional settlement between custodian clients
- JIL Custody Role
- NONE - JIL never holds keys, never moves assets, never takes custody
1AOrigination - Custodian + Source
Where the asset is leaving. JIL never controls the origination key - confirms only.
- Custodian
- Fireblocks, Inc.
- Custodian Identity Verified
- Tenant ID fb:tenant:42, API credential attested via Ed25519 signature match against Fireblocks public key registry
- Custodian Regulatory Status
- NYDFS Part 200 (BitLicense), FinCEN MSB, SOC 2 Type II attested (current). Cert: cert:fb:regs:3f7a2c9e.
- Originating Vault
- Fireblocks vault vault_prod_042 (Subject-Y institutional segregated)
- Vault Policy at Origination
- 4-of-6 Fireblocks co-signer quorum required (Subject-Y approvers: 2 officers + 2 internal compliance + 2 external advisor). Quorum collected on 2026-04-19 16:20:38 UTC prior to Fireblocks calling JIL.
- Source-of-Funds Attestation
- Subject-Y originally acquired BTC 2024-03-11 via OTC desk redacted-OTC-A (KYC on file); chain of custody preserved in Fireblocks audit log. No mixer / privacy-protocol exposure since acquisition.
- Origination Wallet Control Attestation
- Fireblocks MPC co-signing threshold 4-of-6 active. No single party controls the key. JIL receives only the signed intent + metadata; never the key shares.
- Latency Budget from Custodian
- 6 seconds (Fireblocks SLA for institutional pre-authorization). Actual: 5.731s.
1BDestination - Counterparty, Wallet, Rail
Where the asset is going and whether the destination rail is safe to use. Rail-level attestation is the key pre-settlement check: a regulated qualified-custodian trust account is very different from a freshly-created retail deposit address.
- Destination Counterparty (Venue)
- Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC
- Counterparty Legal Identity
- LEI: 549300WCGS4OTMZUCO90 (GLEIF-verified, active since 2018)
- Counterparty Regulatory Status
- Chartered NY Trust Company (NYDFS), SOC 1 Type II, SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001, NIST 800-53 moderate. Qualified custodian under SEC 17 CFR 275.206(4)-2.
- Destination Wallet ID
- Coinbase Custody wallet cc:wallet:982adf, confirmed ownership chain to Subject-Y (same beneficial owner as origination vault)
- Destination Rail
- Bitcoin mainnet (BTC)
- Rail Integrity Attestation
- Bitcoin mainnet operating normally at assessment block-height 889,213; mempool healthy; median fee 8 sat/vB; no active network-level incidents reported.
- Destination Wallet SDN Check
- O(1) hash-table lookup against OFAC SDN + CSL + UK OFSI + EU Consolidated + UN Security Council lists at assessment time. All CLEAR (0 matches). Lists refreshed 2026-04-19 06:00 UTC.
- Destination Wallet Contamination (2-hop)
- 0.0001% exposure to known-bad clusters. Below threshold. WIE-08 CLEAR.
- Destination Jurisdiction
- United States (Delaware-domiciled trust; New York operating office). US-US corridor, no cross-border travel-rule trigger.
- Destination Venue Attestation on File
- Coinbase Custody's published proof-of-reserves attestation (Cert: cert:cc:por:2026Q1) verified. Reserve ratio >100% segregated per customer.
- Destination Wallet Age
- 723 days. Not a newly-created address. First funded 2024-04-26.
- Destination Type
- Qualified custodian trust account - institutional customer segregated. NOT a deposit address on a retail exchange.
2Test Profile Applied
- Profile Name
- PRECLEAR-CUSTODIAN-BFT-v5.0
- Profile Description
- Non-custodial authorization for institutional digital asset movement. FWEA institutional + WIE + settlement integrity.
- Total Catalog Size
- 111 checks (69 FWEA + 42 WIE)
- Approved for this Profile
- 100 of 111 checks enabled
- Out of Scope (not approved)
- 11 of 111 checks disabled for this profile
Coverage transparency: both approved and out-of-scope checks are listed in Section 4 for full court defensibility. No hidden checks, no silent omissions.
3Approved Checks - Full Test Matrix (Section 4A)
100 APPROVED
Each approved check ran during verdict assembly. Method, source, result, and per-check evidence hash listed below. Individually Ed25519-signed and rolled up into Section 6 Merkle root.
| Check ID | Test Name | Method | Source | Result | Evidence Hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FWEA-01 | OFAC person match (origin) | Exact + fuzzy (Levenshtein <=2, phonetic Soundex) | OFAC SDN + CSL | CLEAR | sha256:01of...f1i |
| FWEA-02 | OFAC person match (counterparty) | Exact + fuzzy + transliteration | OFAC SDN + CSL + EU + UK | CLEAR | sha256:02of...f2i |
| FWEA-03 | PEP screening - beneficial owners | UBO graph traversal to depth 3 | OpenSanctions PEP list | CLEAR | sha256:03pe...f3i |
| FWEA-04 | Synthetic identity detection | Document cross-reference + velocity modeling | GLEIF + OpenCorporates + telco records | CLEAR | sha256:04sy...f4i |
| FWEA-05 | Document deepfake detection | Signature + metadata + font analysis | JIL document integrity ML | CLEAR | sha256:05do...f5i |
| FWEA-06 | AI voice deepfake at authorization | Spectral + prosodic + behavioral analysis | JIL voice auth ML | CLEAR | sha256:06ai...f6i |
| FWEA-07 | Destination wallet SDN match | O(1) hash-table lookup (<1ms) | OFAC SDN + CSL + UK OFSI | CLEAR | sha256:07de...f7i |
| FWEA-08 | Business Email Compromise (BEC) pattern | Domain similarity + content ML classifier | JIL BEC detector + OpenAI moderation | CLEAR | sha256:08bu...f8p |
| FWEA-09 | Invoice fraud detection | Invoice fingerprinting + duplicate detection | JIL invoice graph | CLEAR | sha256:09in...f9p |
| FWEA-11 | Authorized Push Payment (APP) scam | Behavioral deviation + destination risk | JIL APP detector | CLEAR | sha256:11au...f1p |
| FWEA-12 | Wire anomaly detection | Z-score vs entity baseline (90d window) | Custodian feed + JIL baseline | CLEAR | sha256:12wi...f2p |
| FWEA-13 | SEPA APP fraud pattern (EU) | SEPA rail-specific heuristics | EBA SEPA registry + JIL detector | CLEAR | sha256:13se...f3p |
| FWEA-14 | UK FPS Payment System Regulator (PSR) profile | FPS reimbursement-risk scoring | UK FPS + PSR guidance | CLEAR | sha256:14uk...f4p |
| FWEA-15 | PIX fraud typology (Brazil) | PIX chain-of-claim verification | BCB PIX registry | CLEAR | sha256:15pi...f5p |
| FWEA-16 | UPI fraud typology (India) | UPI VPA collision + spoof detection | NPCI UPI registry | CLEAR | sha256:16up...f6p |
| FWEA-17 | SWIFT gpi chain substitution | MT103 hop-by-hop integrity check | SWIFT gpi tracker | CLEAR | sha256:17sw...f7p |
| FWEA-18 | CIPS sanctioned-entity routing | CIPS routing graph + sanctions overlay | PBoC CIPS + OFAC overlay | CLEAR | sha256:18ci...f8p |
| FWEA-19 | NPP PayID integrity (Australia) | PayID binding verification | AusPayNet NPP | CLEAR | sha256:19np...f9p |
| FWEA-22 | Cryptocurrency off-ramp anomaly | Off-ramp velocity vs historical | Chainalysis + JIL off-ramp registry | CLEAR | sha256:22cr...f2p |
| FWEA-23 | Check kite / float fraud | Inter-account timing graph | JIL check clearance timing | CLEAR | sha256:23ch...f3p |
| FWEA-24 | Settlement instruction integrity | IBAN MOD-97 + BIC ISO 9362 + endpoint attestation | JIL L1 settlement path | PASS | sha256:24se...f4p |
| FWEA-25 | OFAC country-level sanctions | Jurisdiction routing check (IR, KP, SY, CU, RU-partial) | OFAC country list | CLEAR | sha256:25of...f5r |
| FWEA-26 | EU MiCA stablecoin classification | Token symbol + issuer + whitelist | EBA regulated tokens list | PASS | sha256:26eu...f6r |
| FWEA-27 | EU DORA operational resilience | ICT risk attestation presence | EBA DORA registry | PASS | sha256:27eu...f7r |
| FWEA-28 | UK FCA authorization status | FCA register lookup + passport check | FCA Register | PASS | sha256:28uk...f8r |
| FWEA-29 | FATF International Travel Rule (>$3K) | Originator / beneficiary data completeness | FATF Travel Rule Protocol + IVMS 101 | PASS | sha256:29fa...f9r |
| FWEA-30 | CBDC attestation (eCNY / DEUR / mBridge) | CBDC issuer + compliance-envelope check | BIS mBridge + PBoC eCNY + ECB DEUR | N/A | sha256:30cb...f0r |
| FWEA-31 | NYDFS Part 500 applicability | Counterparty NYDFS-regulated flag | NYDFS covered entity list | PASS | sha256:31ny...f1r |
| FWEA-32 | SEC Reg S / Reg D (if applicable) | Investor accreditation + jurisdiction | SEC filings + investor attestation | N/A | sha256:32se...f2r |
| FWEA-33 | MAS Singapore DPT Act applicability | Singapore counterparty check | MAS DPT licensee list | PASS | sha256:33ma...f3r |
| FWEA-34 | VARA UAE crypto licensing | UAE counterparty license lookup | VARA licensee registry | PASS | sha256:34va...f4r |
| FWEA-35 | State MTL jurisdiction check | US state-by-state money transmitter overlay | NMLS MT licensing database | PASS | sha256:35st...f5r |
| FWEA-36 | Velocity anomaly (origin 48h) | Rolling z-score vs 90d baseline | JIL L1 + custodian feed | PASS (z=0.84) | sha256:36ve...f6t |
| FWEA-37 | Mule account scoring | Inbound-outbound timing + network centrality | JIL mule detector | CLEAR | sha256:37mu...f7t |
| FWEA-38 | Smurfing / structuring pattern | Sub-threshold frequency + 24h rollup | JIL structuring detector | CLEAR | sha256:38sm...f8t |
| FWEA-39 | Geographic anomaly | Origin-destination distance vs entity norm | JIL geo baseline | CLEAR | sha256:39ge...f9t |
| FWEA-42 | Night / off-hours activity | Time-of-day distribution outlier | JIL temporal baseline | CLEAR | sha256:42ni...f2t |
| FWEA-43 | Routing change detection (<72h) | Last-minute routing delta alert | Custodian instruction log | CLEAR | sha256:43ro...f3s |
| FWEA-44 | Account-number change alert | Counterparty account history vs current | Custodian counterparty ledger | CLEAR | sha256:44ac...f4s |
| FWEA-45 | Instruction provenance attestation | Signed chain from originator | JIL instruction attestation | PASS | sha256:45in...f5s |
| FWEA-46 | IBAN integrity (MOD-97) | Checksum + country length validation | ISO 13616 IBAN registry | PASS | sha256:46ib...f6s |
| FWEA-47 | Correspondent chain hop anomaly | Hop-count + jurisdiction diversity | SWIFT gpi trace | CLEAR | sha256:47co...f7s |
| FWEA-49 | Endpoint binding attestation | Destination wallet bound to counterparty identity | JIL endpoint-binding registry | PASS | sha256:49en...f9s |
| FWEA-55 | Fraud ring graph analysis | Community detection on entity graph | JIL fraud-ring detector | CLEAR | sha256:55fr...f5m |
| FWEA-56 | Typology library pattern match | Published typology overlay (pig-butchering, APP, etc) | JIL typology library v3 | CLEAR | sha256:56ty...f6m |
| FWEA-57 | Cross-rail correlation | Same entity on multiple rails | JIL entity resolution | CLEAR | sha256:57cr...f7m |
| FWEA-58 | FaaS (Fraud-as-a-Service) infrastructure | Known FaaS C2 + tooling signature | JIL FaaS intel | CLEAR | sha256:58fa...f8m |
| FWEA-59 | FATF typology pattern match | Graph-motif match across 30d window | JIL L1 + Chainalysis clusters | CLEAR | sha256:59fa...f9c |
| FWEA-60 | Egmont FIU intelligence overlay | FIU-flagged entity check | Egmont Group secure channel | CLEAR | sha256:60eg...f0c |
| FWEA-61 | BIS CPMI payment system risk | Payment corridor risk score | BIS CPMI annual report data | LOW | sha256:61bi...f1c |
| FWEA-62 | Cross-border velocity multi-jurisdiction | Velocity across 3+ jurisdictions 7d | JIL cross-border detector | CLEAR | sha256:62cr...f2c |
| FWEA-63 | Sanctioned-jurisdiction hub routing | Proximity to sanctioned corridor | OFAC country list + corridor graph | CLEAR | sha256:63sa...f3c |
| FWEA-64 | TBML with World Bank commodity prices | Invoice-price variance vs market | World Bank commodity index + WCO | CLEAR | sha256:64tb...f4c |
| FWEA-65 | Pig butchering / romance-investment scam | Behavior + destination + dialog ML | JIL pig-butcher registry + NIST | CLEAR | sha256:65pi...f5e |
| FWEA-66 | FaaS C2 infrastructure attribution | Infrastructure overlap with known FaaS | JIL FaaS infra graph | CLEAR | sha256:66fa...f6e |
| FWEA-67 | ZKP post-settlement attestation | Zero-knowledge proof of compliant state | JIL ZKP prover | PASS | sha256:67zk...f7c |
| FWEA-68 | Adversarial ML drift detection | Model drift vs golden baseline | JIL ML governance | CLEAR | sha256:68ad...f8c |
| FWEA-69 | HNDL quantum-safe TLS verification | Dilithium + X25519 handshake verified | JIL TLS attestation | PASS | sha256:69hn...f9c |
| WIE-01 | Destination wallet age | Genesis-tx trace + funding attribution | JIL L1 on-chain history | 847 days (LOW RISK) | sha256:01de...w1w |
| WIE-02 | Funding source attribution | Recursive source-of-funds trace | JIL attribution-evm + Chainalysis | CLEAR | sha256:02fu...w2w |
| WIE-03 | First-block recency flag | Age vs transaction volume ratio | JIL L1 + chain-specific | CLEAR | sha256:03fi...w3w |
| WIE-04 | Dormancy awakening signal | Long-dormant -> sudden activity | JIL dormancy tracker | CLEAR | sha256:04do...w4w |
| WIE-05 | Dust attack detection | Micro-tx flood pattern | JIL dust detector | CLEAR | sha256:05du...w5w |
| WIE-06 | Fresh-wallet-with-instant-activity | Activity within 1h of creation | JIL creation telemetry | CLEAR | sha256:06fr...w6w |
| WIE-07 | Bulk wallet creation signal | Sequential wallet creation cluster | JIL creation graph | CLEAR | sha256:07bu...w7w |
| WIE-08 | Contamination 2-hop weighted | Graph traversal, decay-weighted exposure scoring | JIL L1 + Chainalysis | 0.02% (CLEAR) | sha256:08co...w8c |
| WIE-09 | Direct darknet exposure | 0-hop match to known darknet wallets | JIL known-bad registry | CLEAR | sha256:09di...w9c |
| WIE-10 | Direct ransomware operator exposure | 0-hop match to ransomware wallets | JIL ransomware intel (Conti/LockBit/BlackCat/Cl0p) | CLEAR | sha256:10di...w0c |
| WIE-11 | Mixer/tumbler exposure | Exposure to Tornado Cash, Blender.io, ChipMixer, Sinbad | JIL mixer registry | CLEAR | sha256:11mi...w1c |
| WIE-12 | Exchange-hack cluster exposure | Mt. Gox, Bitfinex, FTX, KuCoin hack wallets | JIL hack attribution | CLEAR | sha256:12ex...w2c |
| WIE-13 | Known-bad cluster exposure (full) | 0/1/2/3-hop lookup against all known-bad | JIL known-bad registry | CLEAR | sha256:13kn...w3c |
| WIE-14 | State-actor cluster exposure | Lazarus Group, APT38, Russian ransomware | JIL state-actor attribution | CLEAR | sha256:14st...w4c |
| WIE-15 | Transaction cadence anomaly | Inter-arrival time distribution | JIL L1 cadence analyzer | CLEAR | sha256:15tr...w5v |
| WIE-16 | Amount distribution outlier | Distribution vs 90d self-baseline | JIL amount analyzer | CLEAR | sha256:16am...w6v |
| WIE-17 | Bot activity signature | Automated tx signing pattern | JIL bot detector | CLEAR | sha256:17bo...w7v |
| WIE-18 | Burst-and-drain pattern | High inbound then full drain | JIL burst detector | CLEAR | sha256:18bu...w8v |
| WIE-19 | Round-amount trading | Round-number frequency outlier | JIL amount analyzer | CLEAR | sha256:19ro...w9v |
| WIE-20 | Fragmentation pattern | Tx split into sub-threshold batches | JIL fragmentation detector | CLEAR | sha256:20fr...w0v |
| WIE-21 | Cross-chain arbitrage signature | Arbitrage-like paired tx across chains | JIL cross-chain detector | CLEAR | sha256:21cr...w1v |
| WIE-22 | Protocol whitelist match | Interacted protocols in whitelist | JIL DeFi whitelist | 94/100 (HIGH TRUST) | sha256:22pr...w2d |
| WIE-23 | LP quality score | Uniswap / Balancer pool quality | JIL DeFi attestation ledger | HIGH | sha256:23lp...w3d |
| WIE-24 | Rug-pull heuristic | Known rug-pull cluster exposure | JIL rug-pull registry | CLEAR | sha256:24ru...w4d |
| WIE-25 | Yield-farming exposure | Yield-protocol interaction + risk tier | JIL yield-farm classifier | LOW | sha256:25yi...w5d |
| WIE-26 | Flash-loan anomaly | Flash-loan pattern in history | JIL flash-loan detector | CLEAR | sha256:26fl...w6d |
| WIE-27 | Bridge-exploit exposure | Known bridge-exploit interaction | JIL bridge-exploit registry | CLEAR | sha256:27br...w7d |
| WIE-28 | Governance manipulation signal | Flash-loan governance attack pattern | JIL governance-attack detector | CLEAR | sha256:28go...w8d |
| WIE-29 | Cross-wallet clustering | JIL attribution engine (BTC/EVM/SOL/TRX) | JIL attribution engines | No discrepancy | sha256:29cr...w9h |
| WIE-30 | Change-address heuristic (BTC) | Multi-input + change detection | JIL attribution-btc | CLEAR | sha256:30ch...w0h |
| WIE-31 | Common-ownership heuristic | Co-spending patterns across wallets | JIL attribution-btc/evm | CLEAR | sha256:31co...w1h |
| WIE-32 | Bridge-correlation clustering | Cross-chain bridge traffic as identity | JIL attribution-bridges | CLEAR | sha256:32br...w2h |
| WIE-33 | CEX-withdrawal correlation | CEX-withdrawal timing + amount match | JIL CEX attribution | CLEAR | sha256:33ce...w3h |
| WIE-34 | Off-chain-linked wallet | Corporate entity + wallet linkage via OpenCorporates | OpenCorporates + JIL entity graph | CLEAR | sha256:34of...w4h |
| WIE-35 | Real-estate linked wallet | Property-purchase blockchain linkage | ATTOM Property + JIL entity graph | CLEAR | sha256:35re...w5h |
| WIE-36 | Jurisdictional fit (corridor) | Counterparty jurisdiction vs origin corridor | GLEIF + OpenCorporates | PASS (US-SG corridor compliant) | sha256:36ju...w6r |
| WIE-37 | Sanctions-list proximity | Distance to any sanctioned wallet in graph | OFAC + EU + UK SDN + JIL L1 | > 4 hops (CLEAR) | sha256:37sa...w7r |
| WIE-38 | PEP overlap (counterparty UBO) | UBO graph overlap with PEP list | OpenSanctions PEP | CLEAR | sha256:38pe...w8r |
| WIE-39 | Adverse media flag | Counterparty name in adverse-media feed | OpenSanctions media + Dow Jones | CLEAR | sha256:39ad...w9r |
| WIE-40 | Taint-free proof | Cumulative contamination score under 1% | JIL taint calculator | 0.02% (PASS) | sha256:40ta...w0r |
| WIE-41 | MiCA stablecoin eligibility | Token MiCA-registered flag | EBA MiCA registry | PASS | sha256:41mi...w1r |
| WIE-42 | Travel-rule data completeness | Originator+beneficiary data fields populated | IVMS 101 validator | PASS | sha256:42tr...w2r |
3Out-of-Scope Checks - Not Enabled (Section 4B)
11 OUT OF SCOPE
Listed for transparency. These checks exist in the 111-check catalog but were not enabled in this profile. Their omission is explicit, auditable, and court-defensible.
| Check ID | Test Name | Status | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FWEA-10 | Account takeover (ATO) signals | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-20 | DPAN wallet provisioning fraud | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-21 | Magecart / e-skimmer merchant compromise | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-40 | Bust-out credit fraud pattern | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-41 | Round-amount / psychological pricing flag | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-48 | Real estate closing wire protection | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-50 | Duplicate claim detection | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-51 | NPI provider enrollment status | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-52 | Upcoding detection | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-53 | Remittance mismatch | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
| FWEA-54 | Overpayment recovery flag | Out of scope - not enabled in this profile | |||
5Final Verdict
Attested Disposition
CLEARED
Confidence: 99.1% | Authorization attested. Fireblocks executes transfer from its own infrastructure.
Reasoning Summary
- Destination wallet verified against Coinbase Custody's published attestation registry
- Counterparty LEI validated (GLEIF) and Coinbase Custody MSB + NYDFS BitLicense confirmed active
- 0 sanctions match across all 10 jurisdictional lists (Pillar 5 approved check subset)
- WIE-37 sanctions-list proximity: >4 hops clear
- Byzantine Fault Tolerant quorum: 14 of 20 validator signatures across 10 jurisdictions
- JIL L1 anchor: block #892,449, tx 0xee56...789f
- Fireblocks receives signed authorization certificate; JIL takes no custody, never moves the asset
6Cryptographic Seal and Anchor
- Issuer
- JIL Sovereign Technologies, Inc. (DE)
- Signing Algorithm
- Ed25519 + Dilithium-III (classical + post-quantum hybrid)
- Issuer Signature
- d4e5f67890a1b2c3abcdef9876543210fedcba0123456789abcdef0123456789
- Validator Quorum
- 14 of 20 across 10 jurisdictions (70% threshold exceeded)
- JIL L1 Anchor
- delivery-hash: 1e2f3a4b5c6d...
- Merkle Root
- Rolled up from Section 4A per-check evidence hashes
Verify at
jilsovereign.com/verify/
JIL-VR-PC-2026-04-19-E4D3C2B1
jilsovereign.com/verify/
JIL-VR-PC-2026-04-19-E4D3C2B1
7Chain of Custody Timeline
| 16:21:09.003 UTC | Fireblocks POST /pre-clearance/authorize received | req-hash: 5e6f7a8b9c0d... |
| 16:21:09.021 UTC | Test profile PRECLEAR-CUSTODIAN-BFT-v5.0 loaded | profile-hash: 1e2f3a4b5c6d... |
| 16:21:09.089 UTC | 100 approved checks dispatched in parallel | dispatch-hash: 7e8f9a0b1c2d... |
| 16:21:11.318 UTC | All checks returned. Verdict CLEARED. | verdict-hash: 3e4f5a6b7c8d... |
| 16:21:11.804 UTC | Quorum vote initiated across 20 validator nodes | quorum-req-hash: 9e0f1a2b3c4d... |
| 16:21:13.977 UTC | 14 validators signed across 10 jurisdictions (70% threshold) | quorum-hash: 5e6f7a8b9c0d... |
| 16:21:14.412 UTC | Anchored to JIL L1 block #892,449 | tx-hash: 0xee56...789f |
| 16:21:14.690 UTC | Authorization certificate delivered to Fireblocks | delivery-hash: 1e2f3a4b5c6d... |
| 16:21:14.734 UTC | Sealed certificate written to Fireblocks SDV + retrieval-index committed | index-id: VR-INDEX-1776662474734 |
| (custodian action) | Fireblocks executes the BTC transfer from its own infrastructure | (Outside JIL scope) |
Authorization certificate issued in 5.731 seconds. Fireblocks then executes the transfer on its own infrastructure. JIL never participates in asset movement.
Tamper Evidence. Any modification to this record - including whitespace, font, or formatting changes after issuance - invalidates the seal. Independent verification does not require JIL Sovereign's cooperation and can be performed by any party that can compute a SHA-256 hash, verify an Ed25519 signature, and query the JIL L1 public ledger for the anchor transaction. The verification procedure is published at jilsovereign.com/verify and is open-source.
8Authorized Evidentiary Uses
- Federal court admission under FRE 702 (expert testimony) and 901 (authentication) - cryptographic anchor authenticates without requiring JIL as fact witness.
- Regulatory submission to OFAC, FinCEN, SEC, and state attorneys general.
- Custodian compliance evidence for SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001, NYDFS Part 500, HITRUST CSF audits.
- Internal audit trail under BSA 5-year recordkeeping (JIL retention exceeds at 15+ years).
- Due diligence evidence for correspondent banking, MSB registration, VASP Travel Rule.
JIL Sovereign Technologies, Inc. - Delaware C-Corporation - Dallas, Texas
Patent portfolio: 48 issued, 11 in flight. This record is not financial advice. It is an attested computational result. It is a fact, not an opinion.
Questions: Request a briefing - Response SLA: 24 hours.
Patent portfolio: 48 issued, 11 in flight. This record is not financial advice. It is an attested computational result. It is a fact, not an opinion.
Questions: Request a briefing - Response SLA: 24 hours.
Engagement
See a real verdict, in your environment.
Every JIL settlement, pre-clearance, asset-intelligence query, and retroactive verification produces a record of this exact shape. The hashes below would resolve on the live JIL L1; the signatures below would verify against the live SCN validator key set.