What determines how large a project's bond has to be?

The bond amount is fixed by the risk tier assigned during Phase 0 certification, ranging from a lower figure for a low-risk launch up to a materially larger figure for a critical-risk launch. Posting the bond is a precondition to that project becoming eligible for vault liquidity support.

Where does slashed money go?

The slash request carries an allocation structure identifying one or more reimbursement recipients and a per-recipient amount, so slashed funds are directed to specific parties -- for example affected liquidity providers or a market-integrity reserve -- rather than simply disappearing into an undifferentiated pool.

Can a project be slashed for more than it posted?

No. A slash amount is always capped at the difference between the bond actually posted and any amount already slashed against it -- the mechanism cannot slash more than is available.

Launch-Integrity Bond with Court-Anchored Slashing and Structured Victim Reimbursement

Q: What can trigger a bond slash?

Ten enumerated, objective conditions: fraud, rug pull, misrepresentation, wash trading, collusion, treasury misuse, negligent contract exploit, launch-terms violation, undisclosed related-party trading, and regulatory violation.

Executive Summary

Most economic backstops attached to crypto launches, where they exist at all, are informal — a doxxed team, a verbal commitment — with no enumerated trigger conditions and no defined path getting any recovered funds back to the people actually harmed. ProofGuard replaces that informality with a structured, forfeitable bond: an amount fixed in advance by the project's assessed risk tier, required as a precondition to becoming eligible for liquidity support, and slashable only against a fixed set of objective, enumerated conditions.

When a slash is triggered, the amount is bounded by what remains available on the bond, and the slashed proceeds are directed according to an explicit allocation structure naming the reimbursement recipients and their respective shares — not simply absorbed into an undifferentiated fund. Both posting and slashing are cryptographically anchored into the same tamper-evident, hash-chained evidentiary ledger used across ProofGuard's other controls, giving a slash decision the same durable evidentiary posture as any other verdict record in JIL's attestation infrastructure.

Core Innovation: The bond's amount, its trigger conditions, and its reimbursement routing are all fixed in advance and enforced by code — not negotiated after the fact, and not left to a discretionary, ad hoc settlement once harm has already occurred.

Problem Statement

Reputation-only launch models — a team that has doxxed its identity, or simply "looks legitimate" — carry no economic backstop at all. Where a flat insurance-style fund does exist, it typically has no taxonomy of what actually triggers a payout and no defined mechanism for getting funds to specific harmed parties; recovery, when it happens, is an ad hoc off-chain negotiation with no guaranteed outcome.

$25K-$500K

Bond range spanning Low through Critical certification risk tiers (default policy)

Enumerated, objective slash conditions

100%

Slash amount capped at bond actually posted minus any amount already slashed -- no over-slashing possible

Technical Architecture

Enumerated Slash Conditions

A bond may be slashed only against one of ten fixed conditions: fraud, rug pull, misrepresentation, wash trading, collusion, treasury misuse, negligent contract exploit, launch-terms violation, undisclosed related-party trading, and regulatory violation. The condition triggering a given slash is recorded as the event's reason code, not left as free text.

Bond Lifecycle

Stage	Action	Result
Requirement	Bond amount fixed by certification risk tier	Bond record created, status REQUIRED
Posting	Project posts collateral (cash, stablecoin, native reserve, project reserve, insurance, or founder guarantee)	Status advances to POSTED once posted amount meets requirement
Slash evaluation	Slash request against an enumerated condition	Amount capped at posted-minus-already-slashed
Allocation	Slashed amount distributed per caller-supplied recipient list	Status: PARTIAL_SLASH or SLASHED

Structured, Allocation-Directed Reimbursement

Each slash request carries an allocation array identifying one or more recipients and a per-recipient amount. This is what makes the reimbursement structured rather than incidental: the mechanism does not merely remove funds from the offending project, it specifies where those funds go — for example, to identified affected liquidity providers or into a market-integrity reserve — as part of the same atomic operation that records the slash.

Court-Anchored Evidentiary Weight

Both the bond-posting and bond-slash determinations are cryptographically anchored into a tamper-evident, hash-chained ledger before the transaction commits, and this ledger is architected to be forwarded into JIL's dual-independent-anchor hybrid post-quantum attestation infrastructure — the same evidentiary substrate used for the platform's civil-admissible verdict records elsewhere in this filing — so a slash decision carries comparable evidentiary weight to any other JIL attestation.

Prior Art Differentiation

Approach	Bond Scaled to Risk?	Enumerated Triggers?	Directed Reimbursement?	Anchored Evidence?
Doxxed-team-only model	No	No	No	No
Flat insurance-style fund	No	No	No	No
JIL ProofGuard	Yes	Yes, 10 conditions	Yes	Yes

Patent Claim

Independent Claim 73: A computer-implemented method for securing a token launch with a forfeitable performance bond comprising: requiring a bond amount for a launching project that is determined by the project's assigned certification risk tier as a precondition to that project becoming eligible for liquidity support; evaluating a bond-slash request against a fixed, enumerated set of objective integrity-violation conditions; computing a slash amount bounded by the difference between the amount of bond actually posted and any amount previously slashed against that bond; directing the slashed amount according to a caller-supplied allocation structure identifying one or more reimbursement recipients and a per-recipient amount; and cryptographically anchoring the bond-posting and bond-slash determinations, including the triggering condition and the allocation structure, into a tamper-evident hash-chained ledger.